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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a method to estimate separately the size of the 
expected depreciation in an eventual devaluation of the central parity in 
the ERM, and the probability assigned by agents to this devaluation 
occurring in the short run. The proposed method, complements the 
information provided by the jumps observed in market exchange rates 
around realignments with the information contained in interest rate 
differentials on the future behaviour of exchange rates. The separation 
of probability and size allows a richer analysis of the effects of 
devaluations on exchange rate credibility in the ERM. 

1. INTRODUCTION 
The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary 
System (EMS) sets fluctuation bands for the bilateral exchange rates of 
participating currencies around central parities that can be realigned 
under the consensual decision of member countries. Since the creation of 
the System, the exchange rates have fluctuated either around the central 
parity or around another reference parity also located within the band in 
force. The credibility conferred by agents on the future maintenance of 
the central parity and/or the effective fluctuation regime within the band 
is a decisive determinant in attaining the objectives sought when joining 
the exchange rate mechanism. Not surprisingly, papers analysing this 
credibility' have proliferated. 
The credibility indicators proposed in these studies generally focus 
on estimations of the expected devaluation rate (or of the associated rate 
of depreciation of the market exchange rate), this rate being the product 
of two components: the probability assigned to a devaluation occurring, 
and the expected size of the accompanying change in the central parity 
(or in the market exchange rate). 
• 
However, breaking down credibility indicators into their two basic 
components provides a way of tackling problems that cannot be solved by 
using the aggregate information derived from the expected rate of 
devaluation. Thus, on the one hand, Ayuso, Perez Jurado and Restoy 
(1995) show that, if perfect credibility in the exchange rate fluctuation 
regime does not exist, the conventional (GARCH-type) volatility 
indicators underestimate the exchange rate risk. To obtain a satisfactory 
measure, these indicators must incorporate a correction factor, whose 
calculation must take into account not only the degree of credibility 
measured by the expected depreciation rate but also an estimate of the 
size component. 
, Svensson (1991 ) and Bertola and Svensson (1993) are two seminal 
papers in the construction of credibility indicators. Examples of their 
application can be found in Rose and Svensson (1991), Holden and 
Vikoren (1992), Lindberg, Soderlind and Svensson (1993), Caramazza 
(1993 ) ,  and Ayuso, Perez Jurado and Restoy (1993), among others. 
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In addition, the analysis of the probability component is especially 
pertinent to the study of certain aspects of credibility that may remain 
hidden if the aggregate indicator is used. This is clearly exemplified in 
a question that has important implications for economic policy, namely the 
impact of devaluations on credibility. Drazen and Masson (1994) analyse 
the possible effects of devaluations on credibility, and, on a theoretical 
plane, they conclude that the consequences depend on the relative 
importance of two contrary effects: the reputation effect, which would 
tend to reduce the credibility of the monetary authority, and the 
disequilibria correction effect, which would enhance the credibility of the 
economic policies implemented by the monetary authority. 
Conventional credibility indicators that do not disagregate the two 
components are again inappropriate for determining how agents evaluate 
devaluations. In general, a devaluation (when it implies an effective 
depreciation) will reduce the expected size of the jump in the exchange 
rate associated with a further devaluation. However, the impact of a 
devaluation on the probability component is a priori ambiguous. 
Therefore, devaluations that are accompanied -thanks to the magnitude 
of the depreciation- by subsequent reductions in the expected rate of 
devaluation could, nonetheless, mask credibility losses by the monetary 
authorities. This loss of credibility, by contrast, would be reflected in an 
increase in the probability assigned by agents to another devaluation 
occurring. 
The goal of this paper is to develop a method for obtaIning separate 
estimates of the two components in the expected rate of depreciation 
associated with a devaluation, and, from there, to analyse the probability 
behaviour, focusing especially on the developments surrounding a 
devaluation. 
Although few studies have attempted to separate probability and 
size, two in particular may be referrenced to in this paper: Gutierrez 
(1994) and Mizrach (1993). In the first, the size component represents 
the changes in central parities arising from realignments. This does not 
allow using the information about the future behaviour of market 
exchange rates contained in interest rate differentials. Such information 
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is especially useful in this case because, by the very nature of the 
exchange rate agreement, devaluations are highly infrequent phenomena, 
and it is therefore difficult to draw any type of inference based 
exclusively on observed exchange rates2• The second paper uses these 
differentials, but does not draw on the information contained in the jumps 
observed in market exchange rates around realignments, and instead 
makes the decomposition solely on the basis of the different functional 
form in the size (linear) and the probability (non-linear) components. 
The main innovation of the proposed method of estimation is that it 
complements the information on the future behaviour of exchange rates 
contained in the interest rate differentials between homogeneous assets 
denominated in different currencies with the information on the size 
component provided by the jumps in market exchange rates around 
realignments. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops an 
econometric model that provides the basis for estimating the two 
components that are measured jointly in the conventional credibility 
indicators: the probability of future devaluations and the expected size 
of the associated jump in the market exchange rate. Section 3 estimates 
and analyses the size component, while section 4 studies the evolution of 
the probability component, with special emphasis on the impact of 
devaluations thereon. Section 5 presents a simple model to explain 
probability in the case of the peseta. Lastly, section 6 outlines the main 
conclusions of the paper. 
2 In the literature, these difficulties have been generally dubbed the 
peso problem. See Krasker ( 1980) . 
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2. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR ESTIMATING THE PROBABILITY 
OF A DEVALUATION AND THE EXPECTED SIZE OF THE 
ASSOCIATED DEPRECIATION 
As is usual in the credibility literature, we begin by characterizing 
the behaviour of the exchange rate in the context of univariate models. 
Concretely, we assume that the stochastic process followed by the 
(logarithm of the) market exchange rate -St - is: 
where 
{ d;, with prob. Pt-' 
d = t 
• o J WIth prob. I-Pt_l 
and r(L) is a polynomial of order q in the lag operator L . The 
variable d; measures the size of the jump in the market exchange rate 
(depreciation) associated with a devaluation, and Pt-' is the probability 
at moment t -1 that, at moment t , the devaluation will occur. 
We also assume that the depreciation associated with a devaluation -
the first of the variables intended for estimation- depends on the 
variables in the vector X�-l : 
(1) 
The devaluation occurs when a given indicator -Ct -, (which can 
be interpreted as an excess cost for the authorities derived from 
maintaining the prevailing parity) takes a positive value. This indicator 
depends on the variables in the vector X�_l 
( 2 )  
The estimation of the relevant parameters i n  this equation allows us 
to estimate the probability that a devaluation will occur in the following 
period, given that 
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Pt-l = Prob. (u� > -�-l PO) 
Lastly, we assume that the joint distribution of the random 
shocks u: and u� is normal with zero"'mean and variance matrix L 
However, neither the indicator Ct nor the variable dt is directly 
observable. The only available Information is the sign of Ct (i.e. 
whether or not a devaluation occurs) and, if it actually occurs, the size 
of the corresponding depreciation in the market exchange rate d; . If the 
variable (,)t is defined as 
'" = { I, , 0, 
if C, > 0 
if C, ,; 0 
the observable variables are "'t and d; Vt/ "',=1 
The estimation of the parameters of equation ( 1 )  on the basis of a 
sample that only includes the jumps in the market exchange rate observed 
when a devaluation has occurred entails a problem of sample selection (see 
Amemiya 1985 ) .  If the shocks in equations ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  are not 
independent, for the estimator of p4 and 0. to be consistent, a new 
regressor which depends on the parameters and variables in equation ( 2 )  , 
must be added to equation (1):  
where 
4>(X�-lP'I",) 
<I>(X�_lP' I",) 
(3)  
is known as the Heckman's lambda, � and cI> are the distribution and 
density functions of the standard normal, respectively, and, as shown in 
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Ameroiya (1985 ) ,  €t is not homoskedastic . Therefore, the estimation of 
the expected size of the depreciation associated with a devaluation 
requires the prior estimation of equation ( 2 ) ,  which determines the 
corresponding probability. 
However, the estimation of devaluation probabilities on the basis of 
equation (2)  proves quite complicated, for two reasons : first, the 
variables that make up the vector X�_l must be determined and 
measured3, and, second, it is difficult to detect their foreseeably high 
volatility on the basis of the scant number of observed devaluations (the 
well-known peso problem) . Both problems can be at least partly alleviated 
by incorporating in the analysis the information on expected future 
exchange rates contained in the interest rate differential between two 
homogeneous assets denominated in each of the currencies considered. 
The non-existence of arbitrage opportunities in financial markets 
implies the following relationship of parity between interest rates: 
(4) 
where it_1 and i:_1 are the (not annualized) interest rates of two assets 
that mature in the following period and are denominated in the 
corresponding currencies , and Pt-1 is an exchange rate risk premium. 
Equation (4) can be used to remove pC/ac and X�_l from equation 
(3)'. Specifically, this equation can be rewritten as 
where 
and <I> -1 is the inverse function of <I> • 
The probability assigned by agents that a devaluation will occur 
most likely depends on a broad set of factors , not necessarily all of an 
economic nature -political events , for instance- or easily measurable . 
4 Alternatively, equation (4) could be used to remove the variables 
and parameters related to the expected size . In principle , however, the 
sizes are likely to be comparatively less volatile than the probabilities 
and , therefore , easier to explain in terms of the X variables . 
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cP [<l> -1 (nt_1/X�_11l4) 1 
°t_l/x:_lll" 
(5) 
The non-linear equation (5) -where the variables and parameters 
of equation (2) are no longer present- can be estimated by using an 
iterative method whose steps are summarized below: 
1. Estimate by ordinary least squares the linear regression 
• 4 A4 • dt = Xt_1 ... + '-t' 
i . e .  for observations corresponding to episodes of devaluation. 
2. After estimating the expected size of the jump in the market exchange 
rate, Et_1(d;) =d: , use equation (4) to estimate the probability of 
devaluationS 
Note that this method of estimating probability is an alternative to 
using equation (2), whereby : 
The:refore , nt_lid: provides an estimation of <I>(X�_lIlCloc) where 
it was not necessary to specify the variables in the vector X�-l . 
, If the resulting probability is negative (higher than unity), it is 
estimated to take a value of 0 (1). 
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3. Use this estimation of <I>(X�_lI1Clac)' to obtain <i>(X�_lI1Clac) • The 
quotient of the two expressions provides an alternative estimate of the 
regressor A.(X�_ll.\c/ac) to that obtained from a direct estimation of 
equation (2).  
4. Estimate equation (3) including here the variable l.(�_lI1Clacr 
estimated in step 3. If the maximum (absolute) difference between the new 
vector pd and the previous one exceeds some critical level, the iterative 
method is repeated as from 2 with the new estimated size. 
In short, thanks to the incorporation of the information content of 
the interest rate differential, the proposed method minimises the problems 
derived from the existence of a peso problem. Further, it also simplifies 
the procedure for calculating the probability of devaiuation and the size 
of the associated depreciation, insofar as it reduces the set of explanatory 
variables that must be incorporated into the analysis. In the next section, 
this method is applied to estimate the expected size of the depreciations 
associated with the devaluations that have occurred since the creation of 
the EMS. 
3. ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTED SIZE 
This section uses the model described in the previous section to 
estimate the expected size of the depreciations associated with possible 
devaluations in the sample, which runs from 13 March 1979, when the 
EMS6 was created, to 31 August 1994. This estimation requires several 
other assumptions, which are discussed below. 
First, there is a still open debate on the existence of mean 
reversion in the process followed by ERM exchange rates. Neither the 
usual tests on the stationarity of the exchange rate series -even allowing 
6 For currencies that joined the exchange rate mechanism at a later 
date, the sample begins at the time of their incorporation: 19-6-89 for the 
peseta and 6-4-92 for the escudo. The case of the British pound is not 
considered, since it has never undergone a devaluation against the D­
mark. 
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for different means along the sample- nor the results in the literature 
offer a clear answer. In any case, Chen and Giovannini (1992) point out 
the difficulties in testing the properties of the process followed by the 
exchange rates in absence of realignments, from their observed evolution 
between realignments . 
In Ayuso, Perez-Jurado and Restoy (1996) a different 
approach is proved in orden to get an approximate idea of the degree of 
mean reversion in the exchange rate series . Assuming that there have not 
been expectations of revaluation against the D-mark, they find that the 
maximum mean reversion compatible with such assumption is well below 
.002. Therefore , we assume that , in the absence of expected 
devaluations, random walks can approximate reasonably well the 
processes followed by exchange rates. We also assume that uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) holds , and thus the exchange rate risk 
premia -Pt - are assumed to be null. UIP is supported by several studies , 
at least with respect to ERM currencies 7, which are those considered in 
this paper . 
As to the specific data included in the estimation, it must be noted, 
first, that daily frequency is used in order to maximize the number of 
available observations. With respect to exchange rates, given that the D­
mark is generally acknowlleged to be the anchor of the System we focus 
on the size of the jumps in bilateral exchange rates vis-a.-vis this 
currency . The interest rates used in equation (4) are the I-month deposit 
rates on the Euromarket , denominated in the currencies analysed. Note 
that the spread between lending rates with a I-month maturity provides 
information on the probability and expected size of the jump -which we 
assume to be unique- at this horizon. 
For every devaluation, a number of associated I-month jumps can 
be observed in the market exchange rate that is equal to the number of 
daily data contained in the I-month period immediately prior to the 
devaluation. Each of these jumps is obtained by calculating the difference 
between the market exchange rate on each day of the month prior to the 
7 See Ayuso and Restoy (1996) and Svensson (1992). 
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devaluation and the rate registered exactly one month after that date. In 
this way, the use of daily frequency allows us to obtain -for each 
currency and each realignment- some 22 daily observations8 of the size 
of the jump. Table 1 shows the size of the jumps in the central parities 
and in the market exchange rates around these devaluations. Altogether, 
the sample includes 36 realignments', implying a total of 672 
observations. 
As to the possible variables for explaining size, the fact that 
central parities can only be realigned with the mutual agreement of all 
member countries of the ERM was taken into account. Thus, all countries 
are assumed to share a common criterion that will logically attempt to 
prevent competitive devaluations. In characterizing these "rules of the 
game" J which should be mirrored in the associated jumps in market 
exchange rates, several factors were considered. First, the sizes depend 
on the accumulated losses in competitiveness. These losses are 
approximated by the deviation in the real exchange rate against the D­
mark from a reference real exchange rate10• 
Second, the need for a consensus does not necessarily rule out 
some flexibility to enable the specific conditions in each country to be 
considered. This characteristic is incorporated by allowing the real 
exchange rate coefficient to vary not only between countries but also over 
time, depending on other variables that reflect these conditions and which 
are generically denoted as Zt . Specifically, three variables are 
• There are, on average, 22 market days in a month. 
, Due to problems of data availability, the first two devaluations of 
the Danish krone and the first three devaluations of the Irish pound had 
to be excluded from the 46 that occurred between 1979 and 1994. Also 
excluded were five other cases (two for the Belgian franc, two for the 
Danish krone and one for the Irish pound) in which the respective market 
exchange rate appreciated against the D-mark. 
10 Both measured by consumer price indices. The component for 
relative prices in this time series is available on a monthly -but not a 
daily- basis. Here, as in the rest of this paper, monthly variables were 
converted into daily ones by repeating for each day the previous day's 
data until reaching a new monthly figure. 
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considered: a medium-term national interest rate (the rate of 3-year 
public debt), the rate of unemployment, and the anchor country's 
interest rate (l-year). 
Therefore equation (1) can be written as 
where 
�'.t-1 = 0, + 0, (Z,.t-1 - Z,) 
and the parameters must meet the following restrictions 
The subscript t represents the time (in days); the subscript i 
refers to the System's eight currencies that -aside from the D-mark- have 
undergone a realignment, i. e. the French franc, Belgian franc, Danish 
krone, Italian lira, Irish pound, Dutch guilder, Spanish peseta and 
Portuguese escudo; qt is the real exchange rate against the D-mark; 
qi is the r�l exchange rate of reference for each currency, 
and Zi.t and Zi are, respectively J the current and reference levels of 
the variable Z J measured in such a way that they are always non­
negative. The behaviour that this model aims to reflect is the possibility 
that the greater a given macroeconomic imbalance, the greater will be the 
reaction of the expected size to a given loss in competitiveness. 
Rearanging terms, the preceding equation is transformed to the 
following linear equation for the size of the depreciations associated with 
devaluations: 
where the parameters must meet the following restrictions 
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V, = 6, � 0 
Y2,1 = --61qi :S 0 
Y3,1 = --61Z1 :s; 0 
V 4 = 6, � 0 
Using equation (6) and the interest rate differentials, the 
parameters y are estimated under the iterative method described in the 
previous section. The convergence criterion of the iterative process was 
set at 10-6• The main results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. As Table 
2 shows, none of the variables used to characterize possible differences 
in the sensitivity of the size of the jumps to the real exchange rate 
produces satisfactory results. One or more of the restrictions of sign is 
violated and/or the coefficient of the real exchange rate is not statistically 
significant. In the case of the 3-year national interest rate, the constant 
term of the real exchange rate coefficient has an incorrect sign, although, 
as in the case of the variable term, it is not statistically significant. The 
results based on the unemployment rate are no better and, in addition to 
violating several non-negativity restrictions, the estimated sizes are 
extraordinarily highll• Lastly, neither the constant nor the variable 
component of the real exchange rate coefficiemt is significant when the 
German interest rate is used as the Z variable. However, as we shall 
later see, some of these variables do play an important role in explaining 
the probability of a devaluation. In any case, the model that best fits the 
data is the one in which the sensitivity of size to changes in 
competitiveness is constant. The results for this model are given in Table 
3. 
Table 3 shows that, when considered constant over time and 
between countries, the sensitivity of the expected size of the depreciation 
to losses in competitiveness is 24%. The coefficient is statistically 
significant and correctly signed. However, the coefficient of Heckmants 
lambda is not significant, thus showing that there is little correlation 
11 By way of example, sizes exceding 14% are obtru.ned for the Danish 
krone in the 1990s. 
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between the innovations in the probability equation and the innovations 
in the size equation. Consequently, the problem of sample selection is not 
overly relevant in this case12• 
The parameters in Table 3 allow the construction of a continuous 
time series of expected sizes for each currency as from the time of its 
entry into the ERM. Chart 1 reflects this evolution and compares the 
estimated sizes of the depreciations with those that actually occurred 
after realignmens. As can be seen, due to the nature of the variable that 
is being explained (a movement in an exchange rate) and the simplicity of 
the model considered (one constant per country and a single explanatory 
variable whose coefficient does not vary between countries), the model 
reasonably fits the (average) jumps associated with the devaluations of 
the central parities against the D-mark. The fit is particularly good for 
some countries, such as Denmark, but not very convincing in cases such 
as the Dutch guilder. Notable, too, are the model's difficulties in fitting 
the sizes of the depreciations that occurred as a result of the System's 
last generalized realignment in January 1987. Additionally, throughout 
the sample the values of the expected size for each currency move within 
what can be considered reasonable limits. 
4. THE PROBABILITY OF DEVALUATION 
To obtain the probability of a devaluation within the next month, 
we use the information contained in the euromarket I-month interest rate 
differentials (it_1-i:_l) and the sizes estimated in the preceding 
section d: =Et_1 (d;) . Thus, in line with equation (4) and using the 
aforementioned assumptions, the probability series are obtained from 
. . . 
It_1 -It-l 
d: 
12 In fact, the direct estimation of equation (1), which does not 
include Heckman's lambda, provides practically the same estimates. 
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Since the interest rate differential provides information on the 
probability of devaluation for each day of the sample, this method has the 
great advantage of preventing the possible bias in an estimation of such 
a probability based on a sample of Ca>t , -which only takes into account 
when devaluations do or do not occur13. However, the shortcoming of 
this method is that it does not impose a priori the restriction that the 
probability must belong to the interval [0,1], and, therefore, it is 
essential to check, first of all, whether the results are coherent in this 
respect. 
The probabilities calculated under the method described do, in 
general, belong to the interval [0,1]. They only exceed these limits in 
very small percentages of the corresponding samples, ranging from 0.6% 
for the Danish krone and the Italian lira to 6 . 9% for the Belgian franc. 
Moreover, in the latter case, it is nearly always a question of negative 
values, whose minimum (-0.04) is very close to zero, that are involved. 
These percentages do not take into account either the Dutch guilder or 
the escudo when it belonged to the ± 15% band. In the case of the guilder, 
the probability is practically null throughout the sample, with values 
ranging between -0.001 and 0.002. In the case of the escudo, the model 
seems to give a particularly bad fit in the period in question, because 
higher-than-unity probabilities are very frequently obtained. This could' 
be due to the fact that the number of devaluations for this currency -only 
two- was very small and that, in one of them, the market exchange rate 
underwent practically no change at 1-month horizon. That would give rise 
to a clear underestimation of the expected size and, consequently, to an 
overestimation of the probability. For these reasons, the probability of 
devaluation for the guilder and that for the escudo when it belonged to 
the wide band are not presented, nor are they taken into account in the 
analysis below. 
13 The high volatility that foreseeably characterizes these time series 
would be very difficult to detect on the basis of the observed frequency 
of realignments. This has been shown in other studies, and is 
corroborated in the estimations presented below. 
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First, in subsection 4.1, a descriptive analysis of devaluation 
probabilities is given. Second, subsection 4. 2 examines the behaviour of 
these probabilities when realignments occur. 
4.1 A descriptive analysis of realign_nt probabilities 
Chart 2 presents the monthly averages of the estimated daily 
probabilities of devaluation (at 1 month). These time series reflect several 
common patterns among the different currencies. Thus, for currencies for 
which the sample begins with the creation of the ERM (Chart 2a), the 
generalized realignment of March 1983 marks a clear change in the pattern 
of probability trends. The probabilities in the period prior to this date 
reflect higher averages and variances than are later observed, thus 
reaching significantly higher maximum values14. This result seems 
consistent with the fact that, until this date, the realignments in the 
System were much more frequent. Numerous papers (see, for example, 
Lambertini, Miller and Sutherland, 1992, and Thygesen, 1988) have 
highlighted this turning point in the development of the ERM". 
After that, the probabilities of devaluation were downwards in all 
cases, with several interruptions corresponding to periods of tension. 
The decline observed in devaluation probabilities even placed the 
currencies that had remained in the narrow band since 1979 at practically 
null values prior to the eruption of the crisis in the autumn of 1992. 
Notably, the Belgian franc was the currency that benefitted the longest 
from this period of great stability. At the other extreme, the lira failed 
to see a similarly sharp decline in its devaluation probability. 
14 This phenomenon also appears in the few studies in the literature 
that measure devaluation probabilities (see Mizrach, 1993 J and Gutierrez, 
1994) . 
" The period prior to March 1983 has been characterized as a stage 
in which the prevention of misalignments in real exchange rates was a 
greater concern than the need to reduce inflation rates, where 
realignments were very frequent and where, therefore, the System lacked 
a nominal anchor. In fact J in the four and a half years after the creation 
of the EMS J practically no progress was made in the convergence of 
inflation rates, and 56% of the devaluations analysed occurred in this 
period. 
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The devaluation probabilities of the peseta and the escudo did not 
reflect null values at any time either in the sample, The first one, 
however, bf7gari trending clearly downwards after joining the ERM, and 
this pattern persisted until the days prior to the negative results of the 
first Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty (June 1992), -a date 
that has often been signalled as the starting point of the subsequent 
turmoil in the ERM. By contrast, the devaluation probability of the 
escudo, which joined the System shortly after that date, trended upwards 
almost immediately after its entry, 
The numerous episodes of tension since September 1992 (actually, 
on the whole) upward trends were observed as of June 1992) are reflected 
in average increases in devaluation probability in all cases, although, 
logically, of varying intensity and frequency, By way of example, two 
days before the devaluation of the Italian lira in Sep.tember 1992, its 
probability of devaluation reached its highest value in five years. 
At the end of the sample, after the widening of the fluctuation 
bands, devaluation probabilities returned to the levels of stability that 
prevailed before the Danish referendum, except in the case of the peseta, 
the only currency that later -2 March 1995- underwent a devaluation16, 
In any event, in the absence of a sufficient number of devaluations in the 
new stage of !.15% bands, there is no way of testing whether a structural 
change occurred in the model, and thus the latter finding should be 
interpreted with caution, 
4.2 The impact of devaluations 
One question with important implications for economic policy is the 
impact that the devaluations have on credibility" In t�s respect, in 
deciding on devaluations, it is essential to consider whether this measure 
will ease market tensions or, on the contrary, will exacerbate them. 
However, the theory is not conclusive as to the sign of their effect. The 
traditional credibility models underscore the reputation effect of economic 
policy measures, under which a devaluation would constitute a signal of 
16 Recall that the escudo is not considered in this period, 
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"weak" authority and would, therefore, tend to heighten the probability 
of further devaluations. However, as Drazen and Masson (1994)
' 
point 
out, the probability assigned to a devaluation should reflect not only the 
reputation of the authorities but also the state of the economy; even a 
"strong" government may wish -or, rather, be forced- to devalue if the 
circumstances are adverse enough. 
Hence, a devaluation, via the reputation effect, can cause agents 
to lower their perception of the level at which the authorities are unwilling 
to bear the cost of a non-devaluation policy, thereby increasing the 
probability of further devaluations. However, insofar as a devaluation 
places the exchange rate at levels more in line with economic fundamentals 
and reduces the cost of maintaining the exc.bange rate commitment, the 
probability that a future shock may lead to another devaluation will 
diminish. 
Thus, in theory, devaluations can have two contrary effects on the 
probability of devaluation. Determining which of the two will predominate 
is an empirical question that can be analysed by comparing the estimated 
level of this probability before and after each of the devaluations within 
the ERM during the period under study. 
Table 4 presents the probability of devaluation before and after 
realignments. Given the upward tendency observed before realignments, 
the average of the previous week is compared with the average of the 
following month17• The time span of a month is used here, since it is 
short enough to prevent other effects from entering into play and, at the 
same time, is long enough to avoid drawing conclusions exclusively on 
atypical values. Of the 41 cases considered, in 25 the probability 
diminishes after the devaluation and in 16 it increases. Thus, both the 
effect of the reduction in the cost of maintaining the exchange rate regime 
(giving rise to a negative sign) and the reputation effect (positive) 
appear to be relevant, and, in principle, no conclusions can be drawn as 
to the relative importance of each one. 
17 Qualitatively, the results do not change if the average of the 
previous month, rather than the previous week, is considered. 
-21-
However, two empirical regularities are clearly detected that could 
prove of great interest in view of their implications. Chart 3 was designed 
to capture the first. It shows that probability increased after a 
realignment in cases where pre-devaluation probability was less than 10%. 
Conversely, devaluations that were preceded by high probabilities (more 
than 40%) witnessed a subsequent decrease in probability. Moreover, in 
general terms, a negative relationship between the degree of anticipation 
and the subsequent increase in the probability of a devaluation seems to 
predominate. All told, this appears to indicate that the more the agents 
anticipate a devaluation, the more the effect of the correction of 
fundamental disequilibria will predominate. Conversely, "surprise" 
devaluations tend to heighten the probability that further devaluations 
will occur, since in this case the loss of reputation effect predominates. 
Second, a predominance of the positive impact (increase in 
probability) of the devaluations is observed in realignments affecting only 
one or two currencies. Indeed, in 10 out of a total 13 cases of this type, 
the probability rises after the devaluation. The only exceptions are the 
realignments of the Irish pound (1-2-93) and of the peseta and the escudo 
(14-5-93). These exceptions occur in very sizeable devaluations and/or 
shortly after very sizeable devaluations. 
In any event, apart from these exceptions, the results reflect a 
predominance of the reputation effect in devaluations that do not form 
part of a generalized realignment. In such cases, it seems logical that a 
devaluation policy is more readily identified as a sign of weak 
government. Notably, at the other extreme, a paradigmatic example is the 
French franc, the only currency that has never undergone a devaluation 
on its own and also the only one whose devaluations have always been 
followed by a decrease in probability. 
To summarize, from the analysis of the devaluation probabilities 
around realignments it can be deduced that: both the loss of reputation 
and disequilibria correction effects are relevant; in general, devaluations 
with a greater element of surprise tend to increase the probability of a 
further devaluation due to the predominance of the reputation effect; 
conversely, the greater the degree of anticipation of a realignment in 
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central parities, the more the macroeconomic disequilibria correction 
effect tends to predominate, while relatively more anticipated devaluations 
having a positive impact on credibility; lastly, single devaluations send 
a clearer signal of weakness, and, in such cases, the impact of the loss 
of reputation leads to an increase in the probability of further 
devaluations. 
5. A MODEL FOR THE DEVALUATION PROBABILITY OF THE PESETA 
As noted in section 2, one of the advantages of the method proposed 
in this paper is that it allows us to estimate separately the probability of 
a devaluation and the size of the associated depreciation, without having 
to specify the concrete variables that determine the behaviour of the 
probability component. Nevertheless, the empirical regularities 
encountered in the preceding sectlon provide useful information on the 
type of variables that should be taken into account in the framework of 
the equation (2) of excess cost. Notwithstanding this new 
information, specifying an econometric model to explain the behaviour of 
the devaluation probabilities of ERM currencies remains an overly 
ambitious task. Nonetheless, it may well be worth drawing on part of the 
findings in section 4 to estimate a model, necessarily incomplete, for a 
specific currency. Taking into account the periods of currency turmoil, 
the case of the peseta would seem appropriate, in that it is a paradigmatic 
example of the combination of the effects detected, which are summarized 
below. 
Among the empirica.1 regularities detected in section 4, three stand 
out as particularly relevant because of their implications for the type of 
variables that should be included in the probability equation. First, the 
probability patterns of the currencies analysed are similar, possibly 
reflecting the influence of the general performance of the System. 
Second, the existence of a reputation effect entails an increase in the 
probability component after a devaluation, whereas, due to this effect, 
not devaluing should reduce this probability. Lastly, the macroeconomic 
disequilibria that entail an exchange-rate-commitment cost, i.e. those 
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that can be corrected to some extent by a devaluation, should also play 
a role. 
To capture these effects) the following variables were considered 
in the case of the peseta: 
a) Effect of the general performance of the System: the average 
probability of the currencies that have traditionally maintained stricter 
regimes (narrower band), Le. the Belgian franc, the Danish krone, the 
French franc and the Irish pound. 
b) Reputation effect: a truncated trend that takes the value of zero every 
time a devaluation occurs 18. 
c) Macroeconomic disequilibria effect: first, taking into account the 
findings in Ayuso, Perez Jurado and Restoy (1993), we consider the 
relative prices of Spain and Germany measured in terms of the CPI, the 
Spanish current-account deficit in relation to GDP, and the cyclical 
situation of the Spanish economy) represented by the twelve-month 
growth rate of the industrial production index (IP!)". Second, we also 
take into consideration the recent experience of the currency crises since 
the autumn of 1992) in which an important factor appears to be the 
dilemma posed by the maintenance of an exchange rate commitment when 
it requires excessive interest rate levels in relation to the economy's 
cyclical position. For this reason, we also take into account the medium­
term domestic interest rate (3-year public debt) and this interest rate 
multiplied by the inverse of the IPI growth rate. 
18 The widening of the bands in August 1993 is considered as another 
devaluation, since it entailed a significant change in the average of the 
process observed in the peseta's market exchange rate against the D­
mark. In any event, the possible existence of a different reputation effect 
was tes ted and rejected. 
to The use of the unemployment rate as an alternative for the growth 
in the IPI does not qualitatively alter the results discussed here. The 
significance of the variables is, however, slightly lower. 
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Lastly, we also use a variable that reflects the position of the 
peseta in the ·fluctuation band to test the "vertigo effect" discussed in 
several studies20• Concretely, we use the maximum depreciation limit 
minus the exchange rate divided by the width of the fluctuation band 
(depreciation limit minus appreciation limit). The vertigo effect would 
imply a negative sign of the coefficient for this variable, whereas a 
positiv� sign would be consistent with the stabilising effect 
("honeymoon") of the fluctuation bands underscored in the traditional 
literature on target zones. 
As to the dependent variable in the model -the probability of a 
devaluation of the peseta- the peso problem associated with the existence 
of only three devaluations in a sample containing more than a thousand 
data makes it virtually impossible to estimate a model on the basis of the 
dichotomic variable U)t discussed in section 2. Consequently, we chose 
as the dependent variable the devaluation probability for the peseta 
estimated in section 4. Naturally, the use of an estimated variable, 
instead of an observed variable, implies that the findings must be 
interpreted very cautiously. Moreover, the model should not be expected 
to explain the devaluation probability in a large percentage, given its 
high volatility in comparison with the generally much smoother behaviour 
of the candidate explanatory variables, and the above-mentioned 
difficulties traditionally associated with the modeling of the credibility of 
exchange rate regimes21• 
Bearing in mind these caveats, the following (non-linear) equation 
was estimated for the probability of a devaluation of the peseta in the 
period spanning 19 June 1989 (when the peseta joined the ERM) to 31 
August 1994: 
(7) 
where Pt is the (estimated) probability that agents assign at 
moment t to a peseta devaluation in the period of one month, and Xt is 
20 Also known as the "divorce" effect. See Bertols and Caballero 
(1990), Moutot (1992), and Perez Jurado and Restoy (1993). 
21 See, for example, Svensson (1994). 
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the vector of the observations on the aforementioned variables , available 
at the moment t . 
The vector of parameters a was estimated by the Generalized 
Method of Moments , using the regressors themselves as instruments . The 
standard errors calculated are robust both to heteroskedasticity and to 
autocorrelation up to the order of 22, in accordance with the 
characteristics of the equation . 
The main findings are summarized in Table 5 .  The first column 
presents the results obtained when including all the variables considered. 
The economic policy dilemma is represented by the medium-term interest 
rate multiplied by the inverse of the growth rate of the IP!. The additive 
inclusion of these variables separately does not add any additional 
explanatory power to the model. Relative prices reflect the opposite sign 
of what would be expected, although their influence is not significant. 
This variable could be redundant once the rest of the basic variables are 
included. The loss of competitiveness reflected in the relative prices 
entails an exchange-rate-commitment cost. However, this cost could be 
represented insofar as it translates into an external disequilibrium, which 
in turn will be taken into account insofar as it gives rise to lower real 
growth . This could also explain the fact that the coefficient of the 
current-account deficit is not significant, although, in this case J the sign 
is correct ; in other words , increases in the deficit would give rise to a 
greater probability of devaluation. The second column in Table 5 reflects 
the results of the specification that includes only the variables with the 
correct sign. Lastly, the third column presents the model with those 
variables that appear to contribute significantly to explain the behaviour 
of the devaluation probability. 
As can be seen, significance is found for a set of variables that can 
be interpreted in the framework of a combination of the aforementioned 
effects . In some cases, this significance is marginal, not surprisingly 
given the above-mentioned difficulties in modeling probability . 
Thus, in the period considered, there appear� to have been a 
reputation effect, captured by the truncated trend . Specifically, as time 
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passed with no devaluation , the probability of devaluation was reduced, 
but this accumulated reduction was entirely lost when a devaluation took 
place. Note that , among the devaluations considered, the first one had a 
greater loss of reputation impact, and, to date, this loss has not been 
recovered due to subsequent non-devaluation strategies. 
There also appears to have been an effect of the general 
performance of the ERM, since the probability of a devaluation of the 
peseta reacts to changes in the probabilities of ERM currencies 
traditionally subject to stricter regimes . This effect can be explained by 
the agents' perception of the existence of political pressures to prevent 
these currencies from devaluing against those of other countries with 
weaker commitments . Thus, in the event of devaluation of stricter-regime 
currencies against the D-mark, the peseta would be dragged down with 
them. 
A destabilizing effect of the upper limit of depreciation -or vertigo 
effect- is also found, since the greater proximity of the exchange rate to 
this limit increases the probability of devaluation .  This unfavourable 
effect of a slide in the exchange rate on credibility could go undetected 
if its influence is measure by its impact on the expected rate of 
depreciation associated with devaluations . Note that slides in the 
exchange rate reduce the expected size of these depreciations . 
Therefore , a reduction in the size component could more than offset the 
increase in the probability component, and the expected rate of 
depreciation would, in fact , diminish. Also, given the non-linear nature 
of equation (7) , the impact of the position in the band on probability 
becomes more pronounced as the exchange rate moves closer to the 
maximum depreciation limit . This non-linearity of the vertigo effect has 
been underscored in the literature . 
Lastly , as the experience of recent crises and the observed impact 
of devaluations seemed to indicate , the findings signal the influence of the 
cost associated with maintaining the exchange rate commitment. This cost 
seems to be adequately represented by the economic policy dilemma 
entailing the need for a level of interest rates consistent with the defence 
of the commitment but not with the position in the economic cycle. 
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6 .  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper obtains estimations both for the probability of 
devaluation against the D-mark of all ERM currencies and for the expected 
size of the corresponding jump in their bilateral exchange rates. To this 
end, a method was designed whose main innovation is that the information 
provided by the devaluations in the ERM to August 1994 is complemented 
with the information contained in the interest rate differentials in the 
Euromarket. 
The estimations indicate that the expected size of the depreciations 
associated with devaluations depends on a country constant term and on 
the accumulated losses in competitiveness against the D-mark. These 
losses are approximated by the deviations of the corresponding real 
exchange rate with respect to a reference level that is not necessarily the 
same for all currencies . 
The devaluation probability patterns are similar among currencies , 
reflecting what could be labelled the general performance of the System 
effect . Thus, as from the generalized realignment of March 1983, the 
probabilities of the currencies that joined the ERM at the time of its 
creation began to trend downwards, and their devaluation probabilities 
were practically zero in the period just before the ERM crisis in the 
autumn of 1992 (with the exception of the lira) . Neither the peseta nor the 
escudo attained such small probabilities during this period of great 
stability . The recurring bouts of tension as from September 1992 are 
reflected in upswings in probability. At the end of the sample, after the 
widening of the fluctuation bands to :t 15%, devaluation probabilities -
except in the case of the peseta- returned to the levels of stability that 
prevailed prior to the negative result of the Danish referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty in June 1992. However, this finding should be 
interpreted with caution, given the impossibility of testing whether or not 
a structural change occurred as a result of the widening of the bands . 
With respect to the devaluations' impact on the probability of a 
future devaluation, three conclusions should be highlighted . 
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1.  Both the loss of reputation effect (which increases probability) 
and that of the correction of macroeconomic disequilibria (which 
reduces it) are relevant . Thus, the devaluation risk perceived by 
agents not only depends on their evaluation of the strength of the 
authorities, but also on the behaviour of the macroeconomic 
disequilibria that could be alleviated by a devaluation. Therefore , 
a devaluation, if justified by the existence of these disequilibria, 
could have a favourable effect on the credibility of the exchange 
rate regime, and, conversely, a non-devaluation strategy could 
have adverse effects insofar as these disequilibria accumulate. 
2 .  The loss of reputation effect has tended to predominate in 
surprise devaluations , whereas, in general, the more the 
devaluations were anticipated by agents, the greater their calming 
effect, as a result of the predominance of the macroeconomic 
disequilibria correction effect. 
3. Agents tend to give greater weight to the sign of authorities' 
weakness implicit in a devaluation when it does not form part of a 
generalized realignment. In the great majority of devaluations 
involving only one or two currencies, the reputation effect 
predominated, and, consequently, this type of devaluation 
adversely affected credibility . 
Also, the estimation of a specific model for the probability of 
devaluation of the peseta offers the conclusion that this case provides a 
good example of the combination of the aforementioned effects of 
reputation, cost associated with fundamental disequilibria and general 
performance of the System, in addition to a vertigo effect. 
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TABLE 2 .  RELEVANT RESULTS FOR EQUATION (6) . 
Variable Z 
Interest rate on 3-year domestic 
public debt 
Unemployment level in each 
country 
I-year interest rate in Germany 
NOTES: 
Main result 
The parameters y have tha 
correct sign, but: 
�o (t-ratio) = - . 23 ( - . 53) 
6, (t-ratio) = 
. . 
Y2,P1'S Y Y3.Pn 
significant 
The parameters 
. 04  ( 1 . 06 )  
are positive and 
y have the 
correct sign, but : 
�o (t-ratio) = . 10 ( . 31 )  
6, (t-ratio) = . 03 ( . 66 )  
- The table includes the results that cause the presence of the 
corresponding variable Z in equation (6) to be rejected .  
- The t-ratios are obtained from the standard · errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to order 21 . 
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TABLE 3 .  RESULTS FOR THE DEFINITIVE SIZE MODEL 
Explanatory variable 
Dummy ESP 
Dummy FRF - Dummy ESP 
Dummy BEF - Dummy ESP 
Dummy DKK - Dummy ESP 
Dummy LIT - Dummy ESP 
Dummy IEP - Dummy ESP 
Dummy NLG - Dummy ESP 
Dummy PTE - Dummy ESP 
Real exchange rate 
Heckman's lambda 
NOTES : 
Estimated parameter (t-ratio) 
-16 . 22 (-1 . 83) 
-2 .96 ( -2 . 20) 
-3 . 79 (-2.49) 
-2 .84 (-2 .41)  
-0.47 (-0.30) 
-0.42 (-0.33) 
-4 . 18 ( - 2 . 64 )  
-7 . 62 (-3.46) 
0 . 24 ( 2 . 47)  
-0.69 (-1 .41)  
- The t-ratios are obtained from the standard errors robust to 
heterokedasticity and autocorrelation up to order 21. 
- The number of observations is 672, and the R' of the model is 30%. 
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TABLE 5 .  A MODEL FOR THE PROBABILITY OF THE DEVALU�TION OF 
THE PESETA 
Explanatory variable I ( 1 )  I (2) I (3) 
Constant - 1 . 25 - 1 .  29 - 1 . 29 
(-21 . 22) (-26 . 97)  (-28.33) 
Truncated time trend - . 70E-03 - . 73E-03 - . 71E-03 
(-15 .52) (-16 . 99) (-16.62)  
Average probability of 1 . 15 1 . 13 1 . 16 
other currencies ( 3 . 14 )  ( 2 . 87) ( 2 . 86) 
Relative prices - .43 --- ---
(-1 . 28) 
Dilemma .13E-03 . 1 2E-03 . 12E-03 
( 2 . 54 )  ( 2 . 18) ( 2 . 28) 
Current-account . 28 .43 ---
deficit ( . 72 )  ( 1 . 08) 
Position in the band - . 17 - . 13 - . 1 2  
(-2 . 10) (-1 . 88) ( - 1 . 86) 
N 1256 1256 1256 
-, 
R . 77 . 77 . 77 
a 1 . 31% 1 . 31% 1 . 32% 
NOTES : 
- In parenthesis , t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation (up to order 22) . 
- The variables were dated in such a way that they belong to the set of 
information at the time of forming expectations on the future jump. The 
interest rate included in the dilemma variable and the exchange rate 
included in the position variable were lagged an additional period to avoid 
problems of simultaneity . 
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CHART 1 a. EXPECTED SIZES (%) 
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CHART 1 b. EXPECTED SIZES (%) 
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CHART 2a, PROBABILITIES 
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CHART 2b, PROBABILITIES 
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CHART 3. PROBABILITY PRIOR TO DEVALUATION 
AND SUBSEQUENT INCREASE 
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